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Rural Policy: Lessons from Spatial Economics 
 
Prof Henry G. Overman, Director Spatial Economics Research Centre 
Dr Steve Gibbons, Spatial Economics Research Centre 
 
 
Executive Summary 
 
This policy paper is concerned with rural policy. It spells out the lessons for rural policy that 
emerge from recent SERC research. 
 
Urban and rural economies increasingly interlinked: The division between ‘rural’ and 
‘urban’ is no longer as useful for thinking about the economic disparities and policy. 
Agricultural markets are internationalised, lower travel costs allow people to live further from 
where they work and rising incomes have increased the demand for rural amenities 
(environmental, ecological and recreational). This means that the economies of rural and 
urban areas have become interlinked – with important implications for policy. To understand 
interlinked economies, spatial economics focuses on how households and firms choose 
locations by trading-off economic opportunities, living costs and amenities. 
 
Wage disparities: our research finds that area disparities are highly persistent from 1998 
to 2008, despite many policy interventions to try to address them. However, who you are is 
much more important than where you live in determining earnings (and other outcomes). 
Small area effects can be reconciled with large area disparities by noting that people sort 
across areas so people with “bad” characteristics tend to live in “bad” places. Even so, area 
effects play a small role in overall wage dispersion.  
 
Rural areas pay lower wages than urban areas: in Britain the urban-rural premium is 
around 2.5%. Sorting across rural areas is slightly less pronounced than for urban areas but 
the difference between “good” and “bad” rural places is less pronounced. As a result, on 
balance, place is no more important in explaining rural outcomes than it is in explaining 
urban outcomes. Regardless, individual characteristics matter far more. 
 
Spatial Disparities in Cost of Living and Quality of Life: Spatial earnings disparities are 
uninformative about differences in wellbeing unless we take account of differences in the 
costs of living and the availability of local amenities. Across Britain, our research shows 
increased living costs (particularly of housing) tend to completely offset increased wages 
for the average household. In the lowest wage areas, which are mostly rural, differences in 
amenities drive the cost-of-living versus wage tradeoff. In (mostly urban) higher wage areas, 
differences in firm productivity drive the results.  
 
Rural mainstreaming: The previous government used “rural mainstreaming” to ensure that 
the needs and interests of rural communities were addressed. DEFRA measured performance 
against these objectives by comparing indicators of outcomes (number of GCSEs, 
employment rates, etc) to UK averages. This provides little information on whether policy 
is meeting the needs of rural communities. When who you are is much more important 
than where you live, observing better educational outcomes for rural areas tells us little about 
whether policy is delivering for rural communities. In terms of the impact on rural 
communities, the crucial questions for central government concern the effective provision of 
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public goods (e.g. broadband, schools) and other policy interventions (e.g. employment 
policy) in low density areas. 
 
Addressing “underperformance”: Rural areas pay lower wages than urban areas and some 
rural areas pay particularly low wages relative to house prices. Should policy support 
economic growth in rural areas with the lowest performance? In light of the evidence 
this policy makes little sense.  
 
First, rural areas always tend to have lower wages than urban – why would firms pay city 
rents otherwise? Second, much of the reason why wages are lower in rural areas is because of 
lower skills employed in those areas. Policy may want to address these low skills (e.g. in 
tourism or agriculture). Third, many rural areas are attractive for non-economic reasons. 
Rural areas that pay low wages but have high house prices offer good local amenities. If 
anything, as these amenities are highly valued, policy that emphasises quality of life should 
protect them rather than worry about the “performance” of the local economy.  
 
Fourth, tackling high house prices requires expanding supply – improving performance with 
fixed supply simply raises house prices further. Expanded housing supply may not be 
attractive when high amenity values reflect the fact that an area is not very developed. If the 
worry is about house prices relative to wages for particular workers then policy either needs 
to increase their relative wage (e.g. by targeted skills policy) or increase housing supply for 
those workers (e.g. through ‘key worker’ homes). Most economists argue it would be better 
to try to tackle the income problem directly.  In the context of increased local powers this 
raises questions about fiscal incentives for development (supply) and local employment and 
skills policy (wages).  
 
The wider impacts of rural policy: Environmental and farm policy have effects far beyond 
rural areas. In a mobile world, household and firm decisions link outcomes across areas, so 
this is true of “rural” policy more generally. Thinking of households trading off wages, 
costs-of-living and amenities helps clarify the impacts of different policies.  
 
For example, rolling out rural broadband may have several effects. It provides a public good 
to rural communities. It may affect the productivity of firms in rural areas. It may allow 
people who live in urban areas to move to rural areas and keep working. For national 
government, concerned with rural communities, the first of these effects is far more important 
than the other two. The effect on existing firms is likely to be small and why should the 
government care about the composition of particular places? Of course if broadband makes 
rural areas more attractive, this will exacerbate local cost of living issues if housing supply is 
unresponsive.  
 
The fact that places are linked also complicates questions around housing. Local homes for 
local people may address concerns about social capital and apparent inequities but at 
the expense of being ‘unfair’ on other dimensions. Such polices are good for people born 
in high amenity areas, bad for those who are not and would like to move in.  
 
Conclusions: The way in which households and firms trade off economic opportunities 
(wages, income), living costs (housing) and amenities has profound implications for rural 
economic policy. Because area effects in earnings are small, not very much affected by 
policy, and offset by living costs, observed area disparities offer a poor guide to policy. 
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Instead of targeting disparities, rural policy should focus on effective provision of public 
goods and services in rural areas, and on the wider impacts of rural policy. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This policy paper is concerned with rural policy. It spells out the lessons that emerge if we 
examine rural policy through the lens of spatial economics. Spatial economics is concerned 
with the nature, causes and consequences of spatial disparities. Examining rural policy using 
this lens leads us to question the objectives and effectiveness of existing policy. 
 
Historically, when thinking about spatial disparities it was often helpful to think about the 
economy as divided between rural and urban economies. Rural economies where 
characterised by low population densities and the predominance of agriculture. Urban areas 
were high density and the centre of manufacturing and services. These economies were, of 
course, intrinsically linked. Rural agricultural goods fed urban residents in exchange for the 
provision of farm machinery, household goods etc, manufactured in the cities. People also 
moved between the two areas with rural-urban migration driving the great population 
expansion of cities during the industrial revolution.  Despite these links, the agricultural focus 
of rural activity meant that the urban/rural division was useful for thinking about the 
formulation or public policy. 
 
It is increasingly recognised that the (somewhat arbitrary) division in to rural and urban is no 
longer as useful for characterising key features of the spatial economy. Falling transport costs 
for goods and people, combined with rising incomes have increasingly blurred the distinction.  
Falling transport costs for agricultural goods broke the link between farmers and their 
neighbouring urban populations. Markets for many agricultural goods have become not just 
nationalised, but internationalised. Lower travelling costs allow people to live further from 
where they work and to change locations over time without completely severing links to their 
original communities. Rising incomes have increased the demand for amenities provided by 
nature and most recently, to the increasing recognition of the wider “services” provided by 
ecological systems.  
 
These factors, and other changes, have meant that the economies of rural and urban areas 
have become increasingly interlinked. When it comes to better understanding interlinked 
economies, spatial economics emphasises the need to focus on the way in which households 
and firms trade-off economic opportunities (wages, income), living costs (housing) and 
amenities. Viewed through this lens, we argue that a number of existing policy objectives 
make little, if any sense.  This short policy paper discusses relevant empirical evidence 
concerning this three way trade-off and provides further discussion on the implications for 
policy drawing on recent SERC research. 
 
 
Spatial Wage Disparities 
 
Places throughout the UK - regions, cities and neighbourhoods - appear very unequal. This is 
true if we look at average earnings, employment, education and almost any other socio-
economic outcome. Take Gross-Value-Added per person, potentially a good indicator of the 
living standards in different places.  In 2005, the highest ranked (NUTS 3) regions in the UK 
were West Inner London and Berkshire with GVAs of £44050 and £39850 respectively. The 
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lowest ranked were Liverpool and Blackpool, with GVAs that were half of those in London 
and Berkshire: £19800 and £21050. These individual examples are representative of a 
broader trend – the top ranked 10% of UK (NUTS 3) regions have GVA at least 50% higher 
than the bottom ranked 10%. 
 
Spatial policy at all scales is largely based around concerns about these kinds of disparities.  
But these figures are simply aggregates of the outcomes for people who live and work in 
these places. Without further information, we do not know whether the economic outcomes 
for people currently living in Cumbria would be any different if they lived and worked in 
Manchester. We have no way of knowing if the productivity of Cumbria and Manchester 
would change if these movements of people actually took place. Similarly, we do not know 
whether replicating the economic, policy, institutional and environmental regime of 
Manchester in Cumbria would change anything without moving people. In short, it is hard to 
work out what these differences mean in terms of the economic advantages and 
disadvantages that a place offers to the people who live and work there. It is also easy to 
assume from looking at these aggregated figures, that disparities between places are big 
drivers of individual disparities. But this clearly need not be the case. For individuals, the 
differences within the local area could far exceed the differences between different areas.  
 
In recent work (Gibbons, Overman and Pelkonen, 2010) we present new empirical evidence 
on the nature, scale and recent evolution of economic disparities in Britain. We focus our 
attention on disparities in individual wages, because wages are linked to productivity, and are 
an important cause of variation in living standards. We also have very good individual 
(micro) data on wages. Using this micro data we assess the extent and persistence in wage 
disparities across the labour market areas shown in Figure 1. We examine to what extent 
these area differences arise because of differences in the characteristics of people who live in 
different places (sorting) versus different outcomes for the same types of people living in 
different places (area effects). We also consider the extent to which these differences across 
areas contribute to overall wage disparities.  
 
Area disparities are highly persistent: For each of our 157 areas, Figure 2 plots hourly wages 
in 1998 against hourly wages in 2008. Wages are normalised by dividing by the average 
wage in the respective year so that areas with values below 1 have below average wages in 
that year (and vice-versa). If relative average area wages were completely persistent across 
time then all the dots would sit on the 45 degree line drawn in the figure. The dashed line 
(which shows the results from regressing 2008 normalised wages on 1998 normalised wages) 
shows that this is not quite the case. On average, areas with the lowest wages have done 
slightly better, while areas with the highest wages have fallen back although, clearly, the 
effect is not very pronounced.  Further, if we compare the degree of dispersion in the two 
periods (using a standard measure such as the coefficient of variation) then we see that it has 
actually increased. Overall we see a small amount of churning (changes in the rankings of 
areas) accompanied by a very slight increase in the overall disparities across areas. In short 
area wage disparities are persistent over time.  
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Figure 1: Labour market areas 
 
Rural TTWA aggregates Primary urban TTWAs 
 
 
Note: The 157 geographical units (aggregations of TTWAs) used in our analysis 
 
 
Figure 2: Normalised hourly wage in 1998 and 2008 across 157 areas 
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Area effects are much smaller than raw disparities: We can use regression analysis to 
examine to what extent these area differences arise because of differences in the 
characteristics of people who live in different places (sorting) versus different outcomes for 
the same types of people living in different places (area effects). In essence this involves 
comparing the wages for similar people in different places (e.g. comparing wages for high 
skilled workers) and in seeing what happens to people’s wages as they move about over time 
(e.g. how do the relative wages compare for a person who one year lives in Cumbria, the next 
year in Manchester). Table 1 reports the percentage change in wages when we move between 
different parts of the distribution: from the worst to the best area, from the area 15
th
 from 
bottom to the area 15
th
 from top and from the area 40th from bottom to 40th from top.
1
 In the 
first row we present the comparison based on simple area averages. In the second row, we 
make the comparison using similar individuals as they move over time.
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Table 1 
 Worst to best 
15
th
 from bottom to 15
th
 
from top 
40
th
 from bottom to 
40
th
 from top 
Area averages 61.6% 22.0% 10.6% 
Effect for similar individuals 17.4% 7.4% 3.8% 
 
The first row shows how easy it is to make area effects look large. Simply ignore the fact that 
different types of people live in different places and compare the worst place to the best 
place. Doing this, it appears that moving from the worst to the best place would increase your 
wages by 62%. In fact, as the second row shows for any given person, moving from the worst 
to the best place would actually only increase wages by 17.4%. This number still seems quite 
large but this is partly driven by the fact that we are comparing extremes, i.e. the worst area to 
the best area. When we move to make more meaningful comparisons we see that area effects 
imply much smaller increases in wages, below 10% for the comparison in column 2 and 
below 4% for the comparison in column 3. In short, raw area disparities are much larger than 
area effects.  
 
People sort across labour markets so people with “bad” characteristics tend to live in “bad” 
places: Ignoring the role of sorting on area differences overstates area effects by a factor of 
three. Figure 3 illustrates this by plotting average wages predicted purely based on the 
individual characteristics of people living in different areas against the area-effects. The 
figure shows us that London pays higher wages to all workers regardless of their individual 
characteristics (the area effect is positive) but that London also has a disproportionate share 
of workers who would earn higher than average earnings anywhere (so the average individual 
effect is positive). In Britain as a whole, the positive correlation demonstrates that people 
with the best characteristics end up in the best paying places and vice-versa. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 That is we compare minimum to maximum, the 10
th
 to 90
th
 percentile and the 25
th
 to 75
th
 percentile. 
2
 That is we present the estimates of area fixed effects from panel data controlling for both observed 
characteristics and individual fixed effects. 
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Figure 3 
 
Area effects play a small role in explaining overall wage dispersion: We might worry that 
area effects and the positive correlation between area effects and beneficial individual 
characteristics mean that area effects play an important role in exacerbating individual wage 
disparities. After all, people who would be highest paid where-ever they live, actually live in 
the best areas so get paid even higher wages. It turns out that this effect is not very important. 
Even if we assume that area effects are the underlying driver of all observed area differences 
(both in terms of wage differences and differences in individual characteristics) area 
disparities only explain 6% of the overall variation in wages. More realistically, we might 
assume that individual characteristics are determined largely independently of area and that 
people then sort across areas according to their individual characteristics. In that case area 
effects explain around 1% of the overall variation in wages. Quite simply, differences 
between areas play some role in determining overall wage disparities but that role should not 
be over-estimated. Individual characteristics (e.g. low skills) are much more important.  
 
Area effects are persistent over time: Even if area effects are considerably less important than 
individual characteristics in understanding overall wage disparities, it is still the case that 
considerable policy effort has gone in to trying to reduce the impact of these area effects. 
However, Figure 4 shows that, just like observed area disparities, these area effects have 
proved highly persistent over time. As in figure 2, the 45 degree line shows what would have 
happened if there were no changes in the distribution of place-based effects, while the dashed 
line reports a regression line showing what actually happened.  We see that, as for the overall 
area means, there is some churning (i.e. changes in rankings), but the patterns are quite stable.  
Once again, (with the exception of Slough) this stability is particularly pronounced for those 
areas at the upper end of the area effects distribution.   
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Figure 4: Area effects in 1998 and 2008 across 157 areas 
 
 
 
 
Rural areas are different, but not that different: On average, between 1998 and 2008 wages 
in rural labour market areas (those marked in green in figure 1) were around 6.5% less than 
wages in urban areas. Just as with differences across all areas, a lot of this rural-urban 
difference is driven by the sorting of people with different characteristics across areas. When 
we look at what happens to the same individual when they move between urban and rural 
labour market areas we find an urban premium of only 2.4%.  That is, observed area 
disparities overstate the effect on people of moving between rural and urban by a factor of 
around 3 (just as was the case for overall area differences as discussed above). The 
correlation between area effects and individual characteristics is less pronounced for rural 
than for urban areas as is evident in figure 5, which simply replicates figure 3 but now 
dividing areas according to whether they are urban or rural. 
 
Figure 5 
  
 
The fact that sorting is lower for rural areas is reinforced by the fact that the distribution of 
area effects is more compressed so there is less difference between the least productive and 
most productive rural areas. On balance, the latter effect dominates so that area effects end up 
explaining a lower share of the wage disparities for individuals in rural areas than they do for 
individuals in urban areas. Further, over time, Figure 6 shows that there has been slightly 
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more mobility (i.e. changes in rankings) for rural areas when compared to urban areas. But 
overall area dispersion (measured, once again, by the coefficient of variation) increases 
slightly for both rural and urban areas. Rural areas show slightly more churning than urban, 
but overall wage dispersion is still very persistent. 
  
Figure 6 
  
 
Although our research does not examine this question specifically, there is an extensive 
literature that shows that higher nominal wages in urban areas are driven by the advantages 
delivered by density (or agglomeration economies). Firms benefit from density and, as a 
result, can pay higher wages. If firms didn’t benefit from density in some way we would have 
to wonder why they are willing to pay higher downtown rents? One might worry about 
whether, conditional on the lower densities in rural areas, rural wages in Britain are 
unexpectedly high or low. It is impossible to provide a sensible answer to this question 
because wages are only one part of a three way trade-off households and firms face between 
productivity, costs of living and amenities. 
 
 
Spatial Disparities in Cost of Living and Quality of Life 
 
Wage disparities across local areas in Britain are pronounced and very persistent. Earnings 
disparities between different cities and different labour markets give cause for concern, 
because they seem to imply differences in standards of living and economic welfare. But 
spatial earnings disparities are uninformative about differences in economic welfare and 
wellbeing unless we take account of differences in the costs of living and the availability of 
local amenities.  
 
In Gibbons, Overman and Resende (2011), we consider the extent to which higher post-tax 
earnings are offset by higher housing costs. Results are shown in Figure 7 for the same 157 
spatial labour markets mapped in Figure 1. In this picture, the wage gaps between labour 
market areas are estimated from the wages gains and losses for individuals who move 
between areas. The housing costs are imputed from housing prices, after adjusting these 
prices for differences in housing quality (both wages and housing costs are in £000s per 
year). The solid line has a slope of 45 degrees, corresponding to the case where housing costs 
rise one-for-one with wages. Fitting a linear regression line through these points also gives a 
coefficient of around 1, indicating that as people move across areas, housing costs do, on 
average, increase by £1 for each £1 of extra pay.  However, the detailed picture is much more 
nuanced, as the dotted, best fit curve shows. Much of the general upward trend in prices in 
line with local wages is driven by urban labour markets and by rural areas that offer higher 
wage levels on the right of the picture. To the left of the picture, prices are high in low wage 
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areas such as Cornwall, Devon, Dorset and Kendal leading to an overall U shaped 
relationship between housing costs and wage levels. 
 
Figure 7 
 
 
Given that most people in Britain are free to choose where they live higher wages should 
translate directly in to higher house prices for places that are otherwise identical. That is, we 
should expect £1 higher wages to mean house costs increase by £1 per person. In fact, as just 
discussed, on average the empirical relationship in Britain is close to this theoretical 
benchmark. As Figure 7 shows there is also clearly a lot of variation around this general 
relationship. Of course, what drives this variation is the fact that other things are not equal – 
places differ in the local “amenities” (e.g. crime, weather, pollution, entertainment, natural 
beauty) that they provide to households. Places with high housing costs relative to wages 
must offer some kind of local “amenity” (e.g. better restaurants and entertainment, lower 
crime, less pollution) which helps offset the fact that real income is low in the area.  Similarly 
places which offer poor local amenities must “compensate” people by offering low house 
prices relative to wages. This suggests that we can use cost-minus-earnings differentials as a 
measure of quality of life. 
 
Rather than focus on individual rankings, it is most useful to consider what this approach tells 
us about the trade-off faced by people in Britain.  The dashed line in Figure 7 does this by 
showing how the relationship between house prices and wages changes as we move from low 
to high wages. Places with lower wages in Britain tend to be rural (we discussed this at length 
above) but notice that as we increase wages, house prices tend to fall, not rise (so the 
relationship between house prices and wages is downward sloping). This suggests that places 
with high levels of consumer amenities tend to have few productive advantages for firms. 
Consumer demand for local amenities drives up land costs and housing prices, but since these 
areas do not offer productive advantages, wages must also be lower to induce businesses to 
locate there. Households in the lowest wage places are willing to pay high house prices 
because they are compensated by higher local amenities. When you look at the places we are 
talking about – for example West and East Cornwall, Devon and Kendal – this clearly makes 
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sense. These are places in which ‘underperformance’ and the lack of development has gone 
hand-in-hand with preservation of rich natural amenities which are highly valued by 
consumers, even though the wages are low. This high valuation of natural and recreational 
resources, reflected in housing costs, is borne out by more detailed analysis in Gibbons, 
Resende and Mourato (2011). 
 
In contrast when we move to higher wage areas – on the right hand side of the diagram – we 
tend to see house prices increasing as wages rise (so the relationship between house prices 
and wages is positive). This suggests local producer benefits tend to drive the relationship for 
higher wage areas. Firms drive up land costs in these labour markets, and workers must be 
compensated with higher wages to induce them to live in there, but with house prices moving 
to offset the benefits of higher wages. Note though, that in the far right of the picture, in 
London and the South East, amenities for consumers and productive advantages for firms 
tend to be positively correlated across labour markets. Housing costs rise steeply, more than 
one-for-one with wages, indicating that consumers are willing to pay over and above the 
expected wage gain to live in these areas, though here the amenities are undoubtedly different 
from those they expect to find in places like Devon, Cornwall and Kendal. 
 
 
Implications for DEFRA policy 
 
The evidence we have presented shows that area disparities are highly persistent over time. 
However, who you are is much more important than where you live in determining earnings 
(and other economic outcomes). We can reconcile small area effects with large area 
disparities by noting that people sort across labour markets so people with bad characteristics 
tend to live in bad places. Even taking this positive correlation in to account area effects play 
a small role in explaining overall wage dispersion. These area effects are highly persistent 
across time despite many policy interventions to try to address them. Rural areas pay lower 
wages than urban areas. Sorting across rural areas according to individual characteristics is 
slightly less pronounced than for urban areas. However, this effect is offset by the fact that 
the overall spread of rural area effects is lower so, on balance, place is no more important in 
explaining rural outcomes than it is in explaining urban outcomes. Regardless, individual 
characteristics matter far more. 
 
Mobile individuals trade-off spatial differences in earnings against differences in the cost of 
living and amenities. In line with this, across Britain as a whole increased living costs 
(particularly of housing) tend to completely offset increased wages for the average 
household. In the lowest wage areas, which are predominantly rural, differences in amenities 
appear to drive the cost-of-living versus wage tradeoff. In the higher wage areas, which are 
predominantly urban, it is differences in firm productivity that tend to drive this tradeoff. 
There are a number of implications of these findings for DEFRA rural economic policy. 
 
Rural mainstreaming 
 
The previous government adopted the notion of “rural mainstreaming” to ensure that the 
needs and interests of rural people, businesses and communities are addressed effectively. 
DEFRA measured its performance against these objectives by comparing indicators of rural 
performance (number of GCSEs, employment rates, house prices) etc to UK averages. It 
should be clear from the discussion above that this provides essentially no information on 
whether policy is meeting the needs of rural communities. When who you are is much more 
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important than where you live observing that educational outcomes are higher for rural areas 
(a green light according to the monitoring system) tells us very little about whether 
educational policy is delivering for rural communities. It also reminds us that, in terms of the 
impact on rural communities, the crucial questions for national government are around the 
provision of public goods (e.g. broadband, schools) and other policy interventions (e.g. 
employment policy, welfare reform) in low density areas. 
 
Addressing “underperformance” 
 
It is true that rural areas pay lower wages than urban areas and some rural areas pay 
particularly low wages relative to house prices. DEFRA has tried to address this “problem” 
by having a specific policy objective to support economic growth in rural areas with the 
lowest performance. In light of the evidence presented above this policy makes little, if any, 
sense. First, rural areas will always tend to have lower wages than urban – why would firms 
ever pay London rents otherwise? Second, part of the reason why wages are lower in rural 
areas is because of the lower skills employed in those areas. This suggests policy may want to 
address issues of low skills (e.g. in the tourism or agricultural sector). Third, many rural areas 
are attractive for non-economic reasons. Rural areas that pay low wages but have high house 
prices clearly offer good local amenities. If anything, as these amenities (environmental, 
ecological and recreational) are clearly highly valued, policy should seek to protect them not 
worry about the “performance” of the local economy. The coalition government’s recent 
emphasis on overall quality of life appears to be moving towards recognition of this 
fundamentally important point. Fourth, tackling high house prices requires expanding supply 
– improving underperformance with fixed housing supply simply raises house prices further. 
Of course, expanded housing supply may not be an attractive option when the high amenity 
value reflects the fact that an area is not very developed. In this case, if one is worried about 
house prices relative to wages for particular type of workers then you either need to increase 
their relative wage (e.g. through targeted skills or employment policy) or you need to increase 
housing supply for those types of workers (e.g. through “local homes for local people”). Most 
economists would argue that of these two solutions it would be preferable to try to tackle the 
income problem directly. 
 
The wider impacts of rural policy 
 
It is clear that decisions on environmental and farm policy have effects that resonate far 
beyond rural areas. In an increasingly mobile world, household and firm decisions link 
outcomes across areas, so that this is true of “rural” policy more generally. Thinking of 
households trading off wages, costs-of-living and amenities helps to clarify the impacts of 
different policies. For example, rolling out rural broadband has several effects. It provides a 
public good to rural communities. It may have some effect on the productivity of firms 
located in rural areas. It will allow some people who currently live in urban areas to move to 
rural areas and carry on the work they were doing. For national government, concerned with 
rural communities, the first of these effects is far more important than the other two. The 
effect on existing firms is likely to be small and why should the government care about the 
composition of particular places? Of course, if broadband provision makes rural areas more 
attractive, this will exacerbate local cost of living issues if housing supply is unable to 
respond. Note that the fact that places are linked also complicates questions around housing 
supply. Local homes for local people is good for people who happen to be born in high 
amenity areas, bad for those who are not and would like to move. It is unclear why urban 
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residents should be subsidising people to live in places where many of them would probably 
quite like to live too!  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The way in which households and firms trade-off economic opportunities (wages, income), 
living costs (housing) and amenities has profound implications for rural economic policy. 
Because area effects in earnings are small, not very much affected by policy, and offset by 
living costs, observed area disparities offer a very poor guide to policy. Instead of targeting 
these disparities, we argue that DEFRA policy should focus instead on the effective provision 
of public goods and services in rural areas and on the wider impacts of rural policy. 
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